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1. Introduction  
The Dominican Republic is often considered an example of the successful implementation 
of Special Economic Zones (henceforth SEZs) in the Western hemisphere. The zones fueled 
economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s and, while they experienced a sharp decline in 
employment due in part to the expiry of the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement and stronger 
international competition in the textile and apparel industry in 2005, signs of recovery have been 
observed since 2009. Surgical equipment, chemicals and plastics, and footwear have recently 
emerged as the new drivers of export dynamism in the zones (World Bank, 2015). Yet, an old 
question remains: are Dominican SEZs developing activities with substantive domestic value 
addition and fostering linkages to local industries? This report sheds light on this question. 
The special tax regimen enforced by SEZs has been traditionally regarded as an engine of 
economic growth that, however, is relatively disconnected from the rest of the Dominican 
Republic. The literature on economic development in the Dominican Republic has traditionally 
pointed to the existence of weak linkages between special economic zones and domestic firms 
(Kaplinsky, 1993). According to Manzano et al. (2013), one reason for the observed lack of 
linkages owes to the fact that most SEZ industries during the past two decades relied on 
maquiladoras, requiring low-skill labor and exporting products of low domestic value-added. 
Recently, SEZs have started to export more sophisticated products such as medical equipment 
and pharmaceuticals, but these sectors import most of their inputs and have built few supply 
arrangements with domestic suppliers (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2012). A common theme in the 
existing literature is that assessments of linkages between SEZs and the rest of the economy is 
primarily qualitative or based on small-sample surveys, therefore further empirical evidence is 
needed to make more definitive claims.  
The objective of this report is to inform the policy discussion around the developmental 
impact of SEZs in the Dominican Republic by empirically assessing i) the implications of 
regulatory reforms aimed at complying with WTO disciplines regarding the elimination of 
incentives conditioned on export performance for SEZs firms, ii) the extent to which SEZs 
participate in Global Value Chains, and iii) their linkages with domestic suppliers. 
Employing customs transaction data, supply-use input-output tables, and a census conducted by 
the Central Bank to firms in SEZs, this reports sheds light on the following questions: (i) has 
Law 56-07, declaring the textile, leather and footwear industries national priority and, therefore, 
extending SEZ benefits to national manufacturers operating in these sectors, effectively boosted 
exports and affected trade dynamics outside SEZs?; (ii) what is the position of the Dominican 
Republic in Global Value Chains?; and (iii) have SEZ exporters developed greater domestic 
linkages? We complemented the empirical work with semi-structured interviews conducted with 
key stakeholders both from the private and public sectors.  
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The analyses produced five main findings: 
Firstly, a structural shift in SEZs from clothing manufacturing to medium-high skill 
manufacturing was motivated by the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005 
and by the signature of the CAFTA-DR agreement. Historically, export competitiveness of 
the Dominican Republic has largely depended on the type of preferential market access the 
country receives from the U.S. In the 1990s, the US assigned a specific import quota of clothing 
and textile to the Dominican Republic under the MFA, which created a mushrooming of 
maquilas operating under the special regimen. After 2005, the CAFTA-DR provided transversal 
preferences that, coupled with the Dominican Republic special tax regimen, its dynamics policy 
to attract Foreign Direct Investment, and the characteristics of the labor force, created the 
conditions for the emergence of electrical, footwear, and medical equipment products in SEZs. 
Secondly, because the employment intensity in these more complex industries is lower than 
in the apparel sector, the labor implications of this structural transformation should be 
carefully considered. On the one hand, the potential of SEZ zones to continue generating jobs 
at the same pace as before is likely to be reduced. This situation may be particularly 
detrimental for women as they filled the bulk of jobs available in the garment sector. On the 
other hand, the emergence of medium high-skill manufacturing is correlated with higher 
wages as the demand for more skilled workers increases. The recent rebound of the textile 
sector may alleviate the negative pressure on job creation in SEZs. 
Thirdly, the emergency of more sophisticated manufacturing processes in SEZs have 
increased the value addition (production stages) that is generated in the country. 
Upstreamness of SEZs exports –a measure of the distance in terms of the number of production 
stages between the production of a given good and the final demand– have slightly declined over 
the last decade, which reflects the zones’ specialization in assembly of final products. At the 
same time, intermediate imports have moved upstream or farther away from the final demand. 
These two findings point to the fact that more stages of production are taking place in the 
country, particularly in the pharmaceuticals, footwear, and electrical sectors. These findings 
imply that the domestic value addition embedded in Dominican exports have increased with the 
emergence of these medium high-skill manufactures.  
Fourthly, the gains due to more value added being generated in the Dominican Republic 
are not correlated with more linkages being developed with domestic firms outside the 
SEZ. The more sophisticated nature of the manufacturing production taking place in the zones 
(footwear, pharmaceutical, and electrical products) entails that many inputs are imported because 
there is not domestic availability or national products do not meet required standards. As of 
2012, Dominican companies in SEZs were acquiring 81 percent of their inputs abroad.  
Fifthly, the elimination of fiscal incentives targeted exclusively to exporters in SEZs that 
sought to level the playing field actually made SEZs a more attractive location for firms. 
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The expiration of the deadline to make the SEZ program in the Dominican Republic compatible 
with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures led to the elimination of 
the export share requirements (ESR) to receive the incentive– firstly for producers of leather, 
textiles and apparel and leather, sectors designated as ‘national priority’ in 2007, and afterwards 
for all SEZs producers in 2011. The removal of the ESR for firms operating in SEZs without 
altering the fiscal incentives available to them, made SEZs a more attractive location for firms to 
operate in. We find that the pathway to WTO compliance chosen by the Dominican Republic 
created the condition to support the migration of firms that previously operated under the 
national regimen, into the SEZ regimen. The fiscal costs of this policy ought to be measured. 
These findings call for new policies aimed at enhancing the ability of SEZs to support a 
sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the Dominican Republic. Policies aimed at 
encouraging domestic linkages, developing labor adjustment assistance programs, and 
improvements around the institutional framework supporting export competitiveness and FDI 
attraction should be prioritized. The first set of policies includes the creation of a suppliers’ 
database, matchmaking events, the creation of local clusters around the parks, the design of FDI 
incentives that reward domestic sourcing, and the removal of both formal and informal 
regulatory barriers for supplying SEZs firms from the domestic territory. The second set of 
policies includes vocational training in new skills demanded by SEZ firms, job search assistance, 
and transitional income support. The exact intervention should be carefully crafted to maximize 
limited fiscal resources and, ideally, be cost-shared with workers and employers. The third set of 
policies includes a regulatory and institutional revision of the support framework to encourage 
consistency and coordination across both the public and the private actors involved in promoting 
SEZs. Finally, a robust cost-benefit analysis of the role of SEZs in terms of economic outcomes 
(jobs, domestic linkages, etc.) and forgone tax revenue would help to inform the policy debate. 
While the current administration is already implementing some of these recommendations 
(mainly on promoting domestic linkages), these efforts should be deepened. 
The report is organized as follows: The second section presents the historical importance of SEZ 
as an engine of economic growth in the country. The third section depicts the structural shift in 
terms of production in SEZs and evaluates the degree of value addition taking place in the 
Dominican Republic. The fourth section evaluates the degree and evolution of linkages between 
SEZs and local firms. The fifth section shows the impact of the regulatory changes in the SEZ 
regimen undertaken to comply with WTO disciplines. Finally, some conclusions and policy 
recommendations are presented in section six. 
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2. A Country Running on the Engine of its Special Economic 
Zones 
SEZs are geographically bounded areas in which customs, tax and investment regulations 
are more liberal than in the rest of the country. These zones are normally established with the 
goal of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), serving as pressure valves to alleviate large-
scale unemployment, promote exports, and support wider economic reforms aimed at 
diversifying production (Farole and Akinci 2011). SEZs are pervasive across the developing 
world and their performance record is uneven given the different regulatory distortions they 
introduce into the market.  
 
The Dominican Republic is one of the world’s pioneers in the use of SEZs with a program 
ongoing for more than 40 years. Few other countries worldwide have used SEZs as effectively 
as an engine for attracting FDI, job creation, and economic growth (Burgaud and Farole 2011). 
SEZs fueled economic growth during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. After the 
elimination of trade preferences in textiles and apparel in 2005, the sector experienced a sharp 
decline in employment; signs of recovery have been observed since 2009. Exports originating in 
SEZs account for more than half of aggregate export value between 2006 and 2014 —although 
their importance has dwindled both in terms of value and the total number of exporting firms 
relative to the total number of SEZ and non-SEZ firms exporting from the DR. Conversely, firms 
based in SEZs are less important in terms of total imports; during the same period of time they 
accounted for 20% of total import value and constitute less than 2% of all importing firms 
between 2006 and 2014. 
 
The success of SEZs in attracting FDI has been linked to the type of trade preferences the 
Dominican Republic receives from the US. Because of the small size of the domestic market, 
the majority of FDI sought to benefit from tax incentives provided in SEZs and low labor costs 
to assemble labor-intensive products and ship these to the US – so called efficiency seeking 
FDI.
1
 The geographic proximity to the US is the main source of comparative advantage of the 
Dominican Republic. The type of production taking place in SEZs was defined, to a large extent, 
by the type of preferential market access the U.S. granted to the country. Under the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA), the US assigned a specific import quota of clothing and textile to the 
Dominican Republic, which created a mushrooming of maquilas operating under the special 
                                                          
1
 The factors that motivate investors’ decisions differ depending on the industry characteristics and the comparative 
advantages of the host countries. However, the FDI motivations can broadly be categorized as: (i) Natural resource-
seeking investment, which describes a situation where a foreign investor establishes an enterprise in the host country 
to access natural resources; (ii) market-seeking investment, which is driven by the foreign investor’s intention to 
primarily serve the host country’s market; (iii) efficiency-seeking investment, which refers to the type of investment 
in which the investor chooses a host country in order to take advantage of some competitive factor, such as a 
cheap/productive, knowledgeable or efficient labor force, utilities, services etc.; and (iv) “Strategic asset-seeking” 
investment, which occurs when an investor seeks control of a firm-specific asset, such as a brand, distribution 
system, managerial practice or technology.  See Dunning (1993). 
8 
 
regimen. After the abolition of the MFA in 2005 and the creation of the CAFTA-DR free trade 
agreement, the US provided transversal preferences that were central to the emergence of other 
economic sectors in SEZs. 
 
Currently, the SEZs are still a powerful engine of job generation, exports, and productive 
diversification. The number of industrial parks has grown 25% over the last 5 years, standing at 
60 parks in 2014 with an average of 11 firms in each park (See Adozona 2014). The number of 
parks in operation now is the same as it was in 2004 when the clothing sector was buoyant. The 
administration of industrial parks is primarily private (70%), with the remainder either public 
(25%), or both private and public (5%).
2
 Services, textiles, medical instruments, tobacco, and 
agroindustry are the main activities taking place in SEZs. Currently, SEZs provide around 
140,000 direct jobs of which the majority are held by low-skilled workers, although the share of 
technical workers has steadily grown since 2011 (Figure 1). These jobs are held almost equally 
by men and women. It is important to note that the share of female labor force participation in 
SEZs has steadily dropped since 2011, indicating the decline of the textile industry and the 
growth of more sophisticated industries in SEZ demanding more skilled workers. 
 
Figure 1: Direct Jobs Created by SEZs in the Dominican Republic 
(2002-2014) 
 
Note: This figure shows the evolution of direct jobs, by type, in SEZs in the 
Dominican Republic.   
Source: National commission for Special Economic Zones (CNZFE). 
 
                                                          
2
 The fact that the majority of parks are privately owned implies that much of the work to attract international 
investors into these zones is conducted by private organizations or by the national commission of special economic 
zones rather than by the national investment promotion agency (CEI-RD). World Bank (2014) highlights the 
particularities of the institutional arrangement to support trade and competitiveness in the Dominican Republic. 
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Box 1. Lessons and Challenges on Setting up Successful SEZs. The Dominican Republic 
case. 
The Dominican Republic is a renowned case of positive SEZ experience in the Americas. Since their inception in 
1969 and drawing from its proximity to the US, preferential trade agreements, and investment incentives, SEZs in 
the country were able to attract garment manufacturers that were offshoring production. The dynamism of this sector 
boosted exports and helped the Dominican Republic to being the top performer economy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the nineties, with an average growth rate of 6.7 percent in 1992-2000. While the garment sector 
was severely hit by the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement in 2005, SEZs were able to attract investment in new 
sectors, positioning the country in a number global value chains, and leading the way towards economic 
diversification and increasing export sophistication.  
Special Economic Zones’ expansion has been led by both the private and the public sector. In fact, the first SEZ was 
established by a private investor, Gulf and Western. As of 2015, there are 47 private SEZ parks, 15 public parks and 
3 parks featuring joint administration. Through the association of SEZ entrepreneurs (ADOZONA), the private 
sector actively participates in the policy discussion and fosters a series of initiatives, including the creation of an 
export promotion and investment fund.  
Dominican SEZs are also open to domestic exporters and suppliers. While SEZs’ main motivation is often attracting 
foreign direct investment, Dominican SEZs have also favored the presence of domestic exporters and, more 
recently, domestic suppliers. The agglomeration economies, know how, and enhanced business environment 
enjoyed in the SEZs have facilitated the emergence of Dominican exporters, which represent nowadays about a 
quarter of the total firms established in SEZs, including the notable case of Grupo M, one of the largest employers in 
both the Dominican Republic and Haiti.  
Dominican SEZs count with a strong regulator that is also an efficient investment attraction agency. The Consejo 
Nacional de Zonas Francas Especiales (CNZFE), comprising public and private actors, has a double mandate: (i) 
regulate the Law 8-90 on the establishment and functioning of SEZs and (ii) design an integrated policy for 
promoting free zones, attracting new companies, and developing existing SEZs. Over the years, the CNZFE has 
established a Statistical Department, an Economic Analysis and Competitiveness division, and a Promotion 
Department, intelligentsia that helps identify potential value chains and investors. Through a series of economic 
ambassadors, the CNZFE is also present in a number of international exhibitions, and has been successful in 
attracting investors from a number of emerging industries, including surgical equipment, pharmaceuticals, jewelry 
or electrical appliances. 
Authorities have been proactive in the negotiation of trade agreements that increase preferential market access in 
key export markets. In the aftermath of the expiration of the MFA, Dominican Republic joined the CAFTA-DR in 
2007, and became a member of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the Caribbean and the EU in October 
2008. These agreements facilitated the recovery and diversification of the SEZs in the aftermath of the global crisis. 
In 2007 and 2011 the country reformed its SEZ regimen to remove incentives conditioned on export performance, a 
practice forbidden by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting some of the limitations and challenges facing the SEZ model in the Dominican 
Republic. The strength of SEZ related stakeholders has placed the focus of policy interventions in the preservation 
of sources of competitiveness that nay not remain sustainable in the long run —low wages, trade preferences and tax 
incentives— which may have distracted policy makers from the need to address fundamental challenges to external 
competitiveness through structural reforms (e.g. on electricity, transportation costs, and overall business 
environment). In addition, there is evidence that introduced policies have not significantly fostered backward and 
forward linkages between SEZs and the rest of the economy, which limits the scope for further positive externalities 
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and overall economic upgrading.  
Sources: Farole and Akinci (2011). World Bank (2015). 
 
While the SEZ scheme has been a determinant in the development strategy of the country, 
it has also created a duality in its production structure. Products manufactured within SEZs 
tend to be more technologically sophisticated than products manufactured under the national tax 
regimen, which are mostly resource-based goods. Firms based in SEZs are fundamentally 
different than their peers outside the zones in terms of the average size of their export and import 
transactions, number of traded products, and number of destinations or source countries (Table 
1). 
Table 1: Export and Import Outcomes at the Firm-level 
(2006-2014) 
  
Special Economic 
Zones  
National Regime 
  
Exports Imports 
 
Exports Imports 
Transaction 
value/firm Mean  44.98 54.05 
 
5.62 3.32 
 
Median 0.27 4.99 
 
0.05 0.04 
Products/firm Mean  6.38 46.32 
 
4.03 9.91 
 
Median 1 20 
 
1 2 
Destinations/origins Mean  2.58 4.82 
 
1.61 1.47 
/firm Median 1 2 
 
1 1 
Note: Export and import transaction values are denominated in hundreds of thousands US Dollars. 
Figures are averaged across the period 2006-2014. 
Source: authors’ calculations using customs data. 
 
The dynamism of real wages is also different for SEZ and national industries. Real wages in 
SEZ sectors have declined due to the domestic economic crisis of 2003 and the decline of the 
textile sector. Jobs in SEZs decreased from 195,262 to 134,426 between 2002 and 2010 (-30 
percent). The share of wages in total output declined from 22.2 percent in 2002 to 18.3 percent in 
2008, prior to increasing to 19.1 percent in 2010. This was driven both by a decline in 
employment, and also by a decline in wages in the textile and apparel sector, with the total salary 
mass decreasing by 16.9 percent in real terms between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 2). Other sectors 
with a presence in SEZs, such as tobacco processing (-6.7 percent), as well as those related to 
primary goods, also saw a decline in real wages, while sectoral employment modestly increased 
in the period. Meanwhile, medium-high skill manufacturing experienced a dramatic increase in 
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real wages in the second half of the 2000s, compensating for a prior decline at the beginning of 
the decade.
 3
  
 
 
Figure 2. Change in total Sectoral Wages 
(Real terms) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration using National Accounts 
* Denotes SEZ production sector 
 
 
  
                                                          
3
 Medium-high skilled manufacturing includes production of surgical equipment, electrical appliances, 
pharmaceuticals, and optical equipment, among others. 
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3. Changes in Sectoral Specialization in SEZs and the 
Degree of Participation in GVCs 
During the last 30 years, the Dominican Republic has undergone a structural 
transformation from a resource-based economy to a more diversified production base. The 
historical preferential market access to the U.S. underpinned this productive transformation. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Dominican Republic started to diversify its economy, bringing 
to an end centuries of dependence on agriculture, and especially sugar production. By the 1980s, 
the country’s economic focus had shifted to mining, tourism, and manufacturing. Successive 
governments helped build up the country’s manufacturing sector by creating SEZs, which 
offered tariff exemptions and a series of tax concessions to foreign companies. The main activity 
in the SEZs was garment assembly for export to the US in the context of fixed import quotas 
under the MFA. The phasing-out of the MFA, completed at the beginning of 2005, along with 
the signature of the CAFTA-DR agreement and the extensive use of SEZs as a policy tool to 
increase exports and generate job opportunities, created the conditions necessary to attract 
investment from multinational companies that produced relatively more sophisticated goods to 
serve the U.S. market. These facts created the conditions to shift the production structure away 
from clothing manufacturing. 
 
Although non-SEZs have become more prominent in the export basket over the past 
decade, the dynamics in SEZs still drive export performance and have been a significant 
factor in the recent changes in the sectoral composition of the Dominican export basket. In 
2015, exports from SEZs accounted for USD $5.5 billion, accounting for 58 percent of total 
exports. This share had steadily decreased from 80 percent in the early 2000s to 53 percent in 
2013. Over the last decade the share of low-technology manufacturing has remained broadly 
stable, whereas the importance of medium-technology sectors have risen. In particular, exports 
of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and footwear have more than doubled their share in SEZ 
exports (Figure 3). While the clothing sector is still predominant in the overall export basket in 
SEZs, contributing 23 percent of total SEZ exports, the nominal value of clothing exports in 
2015 ($1.28 USD billion) is roughly the same in nominal terms that it was in 2004 ($1.25 
billion). It is important to note, however, that after declining over the first decade of the 2000s, 
the textile sector rebounded after 2010. This uneven performance reflects a restructuring of the 
sector from large-scale sewing to more just in-time production, short series, and full-package 
solutions. Box 2 presents the case of a small clothing producer that managed to survived the years 
of the crisis  
 
Box 2. The Quest of an Entrepreneur to Survive the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
Allen Tejada*, a young Dominican entrepreneur founded Tejada Textiles in 2006 after the Family Dollar 
corporation, a U.S. based corporation specialized in low-price everyday items, approached him to become one of 
its suppliers of cotton shirts and other apparel products. The long-term contract offered by the company in 2005 
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was enough for Mr. Tejada to quit his job in another maquila and take on debt to start operations in 2006. Part of 
the working capital was loaned by the U.S. company. However, with the imminent competition from Asian low-
cost producers in the U.S, the contract was cancelled in 2007 leaving Mr. Tejada with his financial obligations 
and no stable clients. This shock forced the firm to downsize and realign its core product offering towards 
subcontracting for larger textile firms operating in SEZs. The company specialized mainly in low value added 
activities (cut, make and trim), focusing on rather smaller volume orders with a quick turnaround. Over time, the 
company found its niche in just-in-time production. Currently, the company processes an order for the U.S. 
within a three-week lead-time, as compared to six months by its Chinese competitors. This has given Tejada 
Textiles a significant advantage, as US retailers are keen on maintaining lean inventory levels, particularly after 
the financial crisis. The firm continues selling products to larger firms in SEZs, but the prospects in the U.S. 
markets keep improving. Tejada textiles does not serve the domestic market, buys mostly imported inputs, and 
identifies its main competitors in SEZs in Central America. Mr. Tejada hopes to move to full-package production 
(a higher-markup and more value-added activity). However, access to working capital in the domestic financial 
market is a binding constraint.  
* Name has been changed for confidentiality reasons. 
 
Figure 3: Sectoral Export Composition of SEZs in the Dominican Republic 
 
Note: This figure presents the sectoral share of total merchandise exports in 
SEZ in 2005 and 2015. Main sectors are categorized by technology levels 
using the EUROSTAT aggregation of manufacturing activities.  
Source: authors’ calculations using data from the Central Bank. 
 
Changes in the sectoral composition of SEZ have important labor implications. Because 
the labor intensity in medium-technology sectors is lower than in traditionally low tech-
industries (garment production), the potential of SEZ to keep generating jobs is likely to be 
reduced. This implication may be particularly detrimental for women who constitute the lion 
share of employees in the clothing sector. However, the emergence of more sophisticated 
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process is correlated with higher wages as the demand for more technical workers increases. 
The recent rebound of clothing production in SEZs may alleviate the negative impact of the 
change in the sectoral composition of low-skilled workers. To draw any conclusion, it is 
essential to quantify the size of this adjustment costs and disentangle the key factors related 
to the functioning of labor markets in the Dominican Republic. See The World Bank (2016) 
for an analysis of the role of labor markets in limiting the inclusiveness of economic growth 
in the Dominica Republic.  
The emergence of relatively more sophisticated production processes has brought SEZs 
into more complex GVCs. On average, SEZ exports moved downstream (closer to final 
consumers in terms of number of production stages) in GVCs while their imports moved 
upstream (further from final demand) which is consistent with the increasing value 
addition taking place within the zones. In fact, upstreamness of SEZ exports has slightly 
declined over the last decade and is the lowest among countries that are highly integrated into 
GVCs like Mexico, Thailand, and China which reflects the zones’ specialization in assembly and 
final good exports (Figure 4). On the other hand, SEZ imports have moved upstream during the 
same period which reflects an import structure shifting towards intermediate inputs that are 
higher upstream in the value chain (e.g. from cotton fabric to cotton yarn or fiber, for instance). 
Overall, this indicates that the sectoral transformation in SEZs have brought more value added to 
the country. Box 3 presents the calculation of the upstreamness measure. 
Figure 4: Export and Import Upstreamness 
(2002-2012) 
Exports Imports 
  
Note: These figures shows the changes in average “upstreamness” or distance to final demand for the Dominican 
Republic as a whole and SEZs compared with benchmark countries over the last decade. The upstreamness 
indicator ranges from one to five with a lower value indicating a particular product or industry is downstream in 
the value chain or closer to final demand in terms of the number of production stages. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using UN-COMTRADE and customs data 
 
 
Box 3 . Indicators to identify the position of a particular country in a GVC 
The position of a particular country in GVCs can be measured by its “distance to final demand” (Antràs, Chor, 
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Fally and Hillberry, 2012) – i.e. the distance in terms of the number of production stages between the production 
of good i in country c and final demand. Measured as: 
ci cdij dj
d j
GVC DIST D
,
_ 1  
 
Ddj is the distance to final demand in terms of number of production stages in country d and industry j. These are 
summed up over all country-industry (d,j) combinations who use inputs from industry i and country c using φcdij 
as weights. φcdij is the fraction of production from industry i in country c that is purchased as an intermediate 
good by industry j in country d. Evidence suggests that only a few countries have moved downstream. Most 
countries have increased their upstreamness because the overall length of value chains has increased with the 
fragmentation of production. Moreover, the offshoring process that lengthens GVCs tends to affect more the early 
stages of production, although a new wave of services offshoring has been taking place in recent years (Taglioni 
and Winkler, 2016). The comparison between the upstreamness of exports and imports provides a measure of the 
degree of transformation taking place in a given country, with a greater difference between the former and the 
latter indicative of a greater degree of domestic value addition and transformation. 
Pharmaceuticals, footwear, and electrical products are the industries where the number of 
stages of production taking place in SEZs have increased more, improving the feasibility 
that more value added is incorporated into the production process. This is reflected by the 
fact that exports appeared to be closer to the final consumer whereas imports are farther away 
from them (Figure 5). Jewelry and textiles, on the other hand, appear to be farther from final 
demand, indicating that these GVCs may have grown longer and that Dominican firms are 
specialized in an intermediate stage of the production process. For the case of clothing, this could 
reflect the fact that final assembly happens in Haiti because of the benefits the country receives 
from the US trade preferences programs.
4
 It is important to note that while the number of 
production stages taking place in SEZ has increased, the majority of production stages for 
pharmaceuticals, electrical products, and medical equipment still happens outside the Dominican 
Republic (Figure 6). 
  
                                                          
4
 Imports of certain Haitian manufactured textile and apparel goods are eligible for duty-free treatment under the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA). Additional benefits under CBTPA have been created through the 
Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006 (HOPE), the Food Conservation 
and Energy Act of 2008 (HOPE II) and the Haiti Economic Lift Program of 2010 (HELP). CBTPA and HOPE 
established unlimited duty-free treatment for various apparel products, with certain restrictions regarding the source 
of the yarns and fabrics used in the apparel, and duty-free treatment for certain apparel up to certain annual quotas, 
known as tariff rate quotas (TRQs). HOPE II and HELP expand these existing preference programs by allowing 
additional textile and apparel articles to qualify for duty-free treatment, as well as increasing some of the TRQs. 
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Figure 5: Changes in Sectoral Export and 
Import Upstreamness 
(2002-2012) 
Figure 6: Domestic Length  
(2012) 
  
Note: This figure shows the changes in the upstreamness 
measures between 2002 and 2012 for both exports and 
imports for the key sectors in SEZ.  
Source: authors’ calculations using customs data. 
Note: This figure present the share of production 
stages taken place in the Dominican republic in 2012. 
Source: authors’ calculations using customs data, 
Sectoral tendencies on upstream mobility mask significant heterogeneity of responses by 
firms within the same sector. Figure 7 shows the changes in export (left) and import (right) 
upstreamness for firms in the clothing and medical equipment sectors5. Each dot represents the 
upstream position of a firm in 2007 and the arrow shows the direction of the change in 
upstreamness by 2012 with red dots representing firms that have moved upstream and blue dots 
representing firms that moved downstream during that period. Firms are sorted in ascending 
order in terms of export size so that bigger firms always appear on the right. A cursory view of 
Figure 7  reveals at least three important stylized facts. First, changes in upstream mobility in the 
textiles and clothing sector have been more frequent and larger than in the medical equipment 
sector. Second, few firms in the textile and clothing sector have changed their export 
upstreamness and the majority export products very close to final demand. Third, the majority of 
firms in the textiles and clothing sector imported products significantly more upstream in the 
value chain in 2012 compared to 2007 which, taken together with the minimal change in export 
upstreamness shown before, indicates that these firms are performing more activities 
domestically than was the case five years ago. 
  
                                                          
5
 The Miscellaneous (HS 90-97) sector includes some of the most important medical equipment exports of the 
Dominican Republic. 
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Figure 7: Export and Import Upstreamness Changes at the Firm Level 
(2007-2012) 
Clothing Medical Equipment 
  
Note: This figure shows the upstreaness indicator for 
2007 and 2012. The set of firm considered are those 
exporting products classified under the 2-digit HS codes 
50-63 
Source: authors’ calculations using customs data. 
Note: This figure shows the upstreaness indicator for 
2007 and 2012. The set of firm considered are those 
exporting products classified under the 2-digit HS codes 
90-97. For SEZs these codes represent mainly Medical 
Equipment 
Source: authors’ calculations using customs data. 
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4. Evolution of Domestic Linkages as the Country Connects 
with Longer and more Sophisticated GVCs. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment is an important element in a country development strategy 
because it can increase economic welfare by serving as a channel through which the host 
countries access foreign technology, improve the training of its workers, and generate 
productive linkages between the domestic firms and foreign enterprises. The Dominican 
Republic employed SEZs to attract a specific type of foreign investment: efficiency-seeking FDI, 
which seeks to use the country as an assembly and export platform to serve the U.S. market. 
Over the last 20 years, SEZs in the Dominican Republic witnessed a transformation in the type 
of activities taking place in them, from textiles-based production to a combination of more 
sophisticated goods including medical devices, circuit breakers, footwear, and pharmaceutical 
products. The connections with more sophisticated global production networks has deepening the 
belief that firms operating in SEZs operate in an enclave mode with few linkages to domestic 
firms. This chapter measures the extent and the evolution of domestic linkages within SEZs in 
the Dominican Republic and compares this to other countries. 
The share of firms’ total inputs that are imported provide an indication of the degree of 
backward linkages. Engel, Reyes, and Sanchez (2016), in a background paper commissioned 
for this report, assembled a series of supply-use tables that allow the computation of domestic 
value added embedded in exports for sectors operating mostly within the SEZ regime. On the 
basis of these, and for the first time, a series of symmetric sector-level input-output tables for the 
Dominican Republic were constructed, based on existing national accounts data covering the 
years 1993-2010.
6
 This information allows for the calculation of value added in trade and 
backward linkages at the sectoral level over a 17-year-time period.
7
  
Over the past decade, the overall reliance on imports with respect to inputs increased in 
SEZs, indicating a reduction of domestic linkages. The share of SEZ imports in total inputs 
decreased sharply from 1993 (43 percent) to 1999 (approximately 23 percent), prior to increasing 
again over the past decade, before reaching 43 percent in 2010 (Figure 8). While the recent 
                                                          
6
 This analysis stops in 2010 because the Central Bank only reports supply-use tables until 2010. This period, 
however, captures the change in the sectoral composition of SEZs. 
7
 The transformation of the data from supply-use tables into input-output symmetric matrices is subject to two 
caveats: first, there is a change in national accounts methodology in the Dominican Republic which results in two 
different sets of supply-use tables, for the years 1991-2005 and 2007-2010. Second, the differentiation of Special 
Economic Zones and non-Special Economic Zones in the national accounts is given only at the sector level, and not 
at the product level. For instance, food processing and manufacturing is classified as a SEZ sector, but in reality a 
large share of the food processing and beverage industry is located outside SEZs, while cigars production is located 
inside. The methodology applied to measure value-added from input-output tables is based on the work of 
Hummels, et al. (2001), who defined the measure of vertical specialization (or foreign value added in exports). 
Later, Koopman et al. (2008) refined the concept to take into account that the intensity in the use of domestic and 
foreign inputs is likely to be different when the final product is to be sold locally, and when it is part of export 
processing zone. This helps reflect the different nature of the activities taking place in Special Economic Zones. See 
Engel et al. (2016) for details. 
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product diversification SEZs brought more production stages into the country (more value 
addition), the technical sophistication nature of the new processes implied that more inputs were 
imported instead of being sourced domestically. Outside SEZs, the share of imported inputs is 
much lower, and declined to around 15 percent in 2010, whereas domestic value added in 
exports (which were primarily commodity-based) has remained stable at around 90 percent. In 
examining the difference between SEZ and non-SEZ exports it is worth noting that these 
significant gaps mirror the results found in other countries that have large SEZ-based processing 
sectors. 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of Imports as a Share of Total Inputs 
 
Note: This figure presents the importance of imported inputs as a 
share to total inputs, differentiating sectors by their tax regime.  
Source: World Bank staff calculation using National Accounts 
of the Dominican Republic 
 
The reduction in domestic linkages in SEZ seems to be widespread across all sector, with 
the exception of low-medium technological manufacturing. The low degree of domestic 
linkages is also evident when the measures of linkages are computed using total production 
instead of exports (Figure 9).
8
 As a share of total production, between 2002 and 2010 the use of 
domestic inputs declined in beverage and tobacco, textiles, and high-medium technological 
manufacture. More recent data collected by the Central Bank indicates that the share of domestic 
inputs have continue to decline after 2010 (see Box 4). One important caveat is in order: There 
are firms that move to SEZ to become supplier of exporting firms. The methodology employed 
here do not take them into account because there is not information about transaction within SEZ 
firms. Therefore, the estimates presented in this report should be considered as a lower-bound to 
the level of domestic linkages. 
                                                          
8
 Given than mostly all production in SEZs is exported, it should not come as a surprise that the analysis using 
exports or total production is very similar. 
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Figure 9: Domestic Inputs in SEZs as a share of Total Output 
(2002 and 2010) 
 
Note: This figure decomposes sectoral output for 2002 and 2010 into value added, imported inputs, and domestic 
inputs for some selected industries. The decomposition of tobacco and textiles is presented while the rest of 
activities are pulled according to their technological intensity. The sectors are classified using the NACE 
classification and categorized by technology levels using the EUROSTAT aggregation of the manufacturing 
industry. 
Source: Engel et at (2016). 
 
Box 4 . Backward Linkages based on the Economic Census of Companies in SEZs 
 
In 2014, the Central Bank published the results of a census of companies operating under SEZs. The main 
objective was to depict the landscape of the characteristics of the firms operating within the special tax regimen. 
One of the issues that was covered was the extent of backward linkages, measured mainly by the source of inputs. 
The results indicate that the headquarters or affiliated companies outside the Dominican Republic supply 
81% of the raw materials used by firms located in SEZs. The remainder of domestic input is divided between 7 
percent of inputs purchased from Dominican companies outside SEZs and 12 percent inside SEZs. The census 
also found significant variation between the sourcing patterns of traditional zone industries like textile & clothing 
and footwear (which source 28 percent and 22 percent of their inputs domestically, respectively) and newer 
industries like medical and surgical equipment and electrical equipment (which source less than three percent of 
their inputs domestically). 
 
Few manufacturing linkages have been created between firms inside the zones resulting in very few forward 
linkages that could benefit the domestic economy. The majority of firms that sell a large percentage of their 
output inside zones are not other manufacturing firms but ancillary services companies in sectors like 
construction, civil engineering, manufacturers of plastic, paper and wood containers, and cleaning companies – 
all of which report at least 85 percent of their sales to other firms within zones. 
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Share of Local Inputs in Total Inputs  
 
                       Source: Banco Central dela República Dominica (2014) 
 
The small size of backward linkages is also compounded by the fact that most SEZs companies also import the 
majority of their machinery (87 percent). Footwear manufacturing imports 94 percent of its machinery, finishing 
of textile products imports 90 percent, while manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical 
products sector imports 75 percent of its machinery. 
. 
 
Relatively low reliance on domestic inputs may be due to the fact that, similar to Mauritius, 
the Dominican Republic is more integrated in global value chains than other economies. 
Overall domestic value added in Dominican exports, at 68 percent, seems to be lower than in 
other CAFTA countries. A caveat is that the Dominican National Accounts and EORA data may 
present different definitions for the components of domestic value added, so these comparisons 
have to be taken with a pinch of salt.  In addition, if we compare the Dominican Republic with 
other countries that have more sophisticated manufacturing sectors such as China and Mexico, 
requiring far more inputs, domestic value added in manufactured exports is around or below 40 
percent (Koopman et al., 2008; De la Cruz et al., 2011; Fujii-Gambero and Cervantes-Martinez, 
2013). Thus, further decline in the share of domestic value added in exports could be expected 
should the Dominican Republic eventually move into sectors that are even more integrated in 
global value chains, such as the automotive or electronics. 
 
The Government identifies the development of domestic linkages as a vital component to 
enhance the role of SEZs as promotor of economic growth. The national commission for 
SEZs (CNZF) has identified the production of plastics, paper, and packaging services as items 
with large potential to create linkages with SEZ firms. To promote domestic linkages, the CNZF 
organized in 2015 a match-making round in which more than 60 business to business meetings 
took place. In 2016, this effort is being scaled up by bringing other institutions, such as the 
national association of exporters, representatives of chamber of commerce, and other industry 
representatives. Currently, the CNZF is training domestic producer on the quality certifications 
needed to become suppliers of SEZ firms.   
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5. Strategic Sectors and the Challenge to Comply with 
Multilateral Commitments 
 
The current regulatory framework governing SEZs in the Dominican Republic dates from 
the beginning of the 1990s. The Law 8-90 of January 1990, which established the regulatory 
framework governing SEZs, stated that its objectives were to attract local and foreign 
investment, provide training, and foment the transfer of technology and know-how in order to 
create employment, particularly in economically deprived areas, such as the border with Haiti. 
To achieve these objectives, the law granted a generous array of fiscal incentives to firms located 
in SEZs. These included duty-free access to imported inputs and capital goods for 15-year after 
they start to operate in SEZs or for 20 years if the firm is located in border zones, as well as 100 
percent exemption for taxes on registration, construction, gross sales and transfer of industrial 
goods (the so-called ITBIS). In return for these generous incentives, firms located in SEZs face 
significant limitations to sell their output domestically. They had to pay the full import duty on 
goods sold in the Dominican Republic, and crucially, were required to export at least 80 percent 
of their sales outside the Dominican Republic customs territory. In other words, firms operating 
in SEZs faced an 80 percent export share requirement (ESR).
9
 
The General Council of the World Trade Organization established December 2015 as the 
final deadline for the elimination of export subsidies in the Dominican Republic. Due to its 
per-capita income level, the Dominican Republic, along with 18 other developing countries, had 
been exempt from complying with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM).
10
 The mandate from the WTO implied that export-related subsidies and fiscal 
incentives to firms operating in SEZs needed to be scrapped.  
In an effort to make SEZs compliant with the WTO’s disciplines, the country reformed the 
SEZ regime in 2007 and declared the textile, footwear and leather industries, ‘national 
priority’ sectors. Due to the importance of these industries in terms of job creation, Law 56-07 
sought to provide support to firms operating in priority sectors in response to adverse external 
circumstances such as China’s entry into the WTO and the end of the MFA in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, it extended the tax concessions and duty-free access to imported inputs to firms operating 
outside SEZ. Secondly, the 80 percent ESR was removed for firms located in SEZ, thus leveling 
the playing field between producers located within and outside the SEZs. The law maintained the 
ESR for SEZ firms producing non-priority goods but offered SEZ firms in non-priority sectors 
duty-free access to the domestic market provided that either the good in question was not 
                                                          
9
 Firms located outside SEZ — which in turn exported through the national customs regime — were not subject to 
any performance obligations regarding their export behavior. Defever and Riaño (2016) show that imposing ESR on 
export subsidies makes them substantially more distortive; unlike unconditional subsidies, subsidies subject to ESR 
provide greater protection to low-productive firms from international competition. 
10
 The ASCM addresses multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of subsidies and the use of countervailing 
measures to offset injury caused by subsidized imports. They are enforced through invocation of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. Countervailing duties are a unilateral instrument, which may be applied by a Member after 
an investigation by that Member and a determination that the criteria set forth in the SCM Agreement are satisfied. 
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produced in the Dominican Republic, or, that it incorporated at least 25 percent of locally-
sourced intermediate inputs in value terms. The latter measure sought to foster backward 
linkages between the SEZ and the rest of the economy, which were quite limited before 2007. 
Tax concessions available to SEZ firms in both priority and non-priority sectors did not change 
with this reform. Firms producing non-priority goods and located outside SEZs were not directly 
affected by Law 56-07. Table 2 presents the main incentives provided to firms located in SEZs 
compared with firms exporting through the national customs regime and highlights the 
subsequent reforms introduced in the regulatory framework 
In 2011, Law 139-11 fully eliminated export share requirements for all SEZ firms 
regardless of their sector of operation in accordance with the compromises signed under 
the CAFTA-DR free trade agreement. SEZ firms in priority sectors retain their duty-free 
access to the Dominican market whereas their non-priority SEZ counterparts are required to pay 
the customary import tariffs mandated by the national customs regime in order to sell in the 
domestic market. All SEZ firms are now required to pay a 3.5% gross sales tax and 18% VAT on 
their domestic sales. Non-SEZ firms were not directly affected by this law (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Changes in SEZ Regulations in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2014 
    
National Priority Sector Non-Priority Sector 
SE
Z 
fi
rm
s 
2006-07 
80% ESR; duty-free imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods; full exemption of 
gross sales, registration, construction, export and re-export and transfer of industrial 
goods (ITBIS) taxes for 15 years (20 years for firms in border SEZ) 
2008-11 
Law 56-
07 
ESR fully removed; duty-free access to 
domestic market 
80% ESR remains; duty-free access on 
domestic sales if product in question is not 
produced in Dominican Republic or has at 
least 25% of local input content 
2012-14 
Law 
139-11 
Domestic sales remain free of import 
duties but are subject to 3.5% tax on gross 
sales and 18% VAT 
ESR fully removed; Domestic sales are 
subject to import duty, 3.5% tax on gross 
sales and 18% VAT 
N
o
n
-S
EZ
 f
ir
m
s 
2006-07 No ESR; subject to national customs regime 
2008-11 
Law 56-
07 
Duty-free access to 126 'priority' 
intermediate inputs; exemption of  tax on 
industrial transfer of goods (ITBIS) 
No change 
2012-14 
Law 
139-11 
No change 
Source: Laws 8-90, 56-07 and 139-11. 
 
The implications of these externally anchored regulatory reforms in SEZs on the 
competitiveness of Dominican exporters is important from a policy perspective. While 
nowadays there is a broad agreement on the fact that the current regulatory environment is 
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WTO-compliant, measuring the impact of a de-facto nationalization of incentives around priority 
sectors in export performance is crucial to evaluating the existing framework for export 
promotion in the Dominican Republic. As the foregone fiscal revenue is sizeable, it is crucial to 
rigorously measure the trade impact of these reforms. Defever, Reyes, Riaño, and Sanchéz 
(2016), in a paper commissioned for this report, measure the impact of these regulatory changes 
on export performance at the product and firm level. 
The elimination of the ESR for SEZ firms and the extension of fiscal incentives to non-SEZ 
firms in priority sectors mandated by Law 56-07 did not have a strong impact on export 
performance. Figure 1 shows the export perfomance of priority and non-priority sectors over the 
last decade in terms of export value and number of exporting firms.
11
 The textiles and apparel, 
leather and footwear industries accounted for about one-fifth of the Dominican Republic’s 
aggregate exports, almost all of which originated from SEZs prior to the 2007 reform. Since the 
beginning of the 2000s, exports of these products had experienced a secular decline due to more 
intense competition from low-wage producers at the regional (e.g. Haiti, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) and global level (e.g. Bangladesh, China and Vietnam), which resulted in Dominican 
exporters experiencing substantial market share losses in the United States. In terms of the 
composition of export flows, SEZ firms still account for the overwhelming majority of priority 
sector exports in terms of value (the share of non-SEZ exports increased by 1 percentage point 
from 1.5 to 2.5 percent). Extending the fiscal incentives available in SEZs to producers exporting 
under the national regime does not appear to have reoriented exports away from SEZs in priority 
sectors.  
Following the full elimination of ESR across the board in 2012, however, there is a 
substantial surge in the number of exporting firms among non-SEZ producers in non-
priority sectors. This pattern is consistent with a longer-term trend of greater export dynamism 
for firms operating outside SEZs identified by Burgaud and Farole (2011) and World Bank 
(2014). Although there is little mobility of continuing exporters into or out of SEZ status, a 
significant share of firms moved out of SEZs into the national customs regime after 2012, 
especially in non-priority sectors (Figure 11). The number of exporting firms in priority sectors 
located outside SEZs increased noticeably in 2012-2014, compared to the previous period, while 
the share in total export volume remained modest. 
  
                                                          
11
 Export perfromance is of course influenced by the global financial crisis in 2008-09, which was subsequently 
followed by a quick recovery in 2010. 
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Figure 10: Export Volume by SEZ and Priority 
Status over Time 
Figure 11: Number of Exporting Firms by SEZ and 
Priority Status over Time 
  
Note: This figure shows the volume of total exports according 
to firms’ SEZ status and whether they produce national priority 
products. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Note: This figure shows the number of exporting firms 
according to their SEZ status and whether they produce or 
not national priority products. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
While the regulatory reforms did not statistically increase exports, it encouraged more 
firms to be established in SEZs. Defever, Reyes, Riaño, and Sanchéz (2016) shows that the 
elimination of the ESR constraint on SEZ firms increased the attractiveness of exporting from 
SEZs. The elimination of ESR in 2007 and 2011 increased the share of exports in terms of value 
originating from SEZs for narrowly-defined products (at HS-6 level of disaggregation).
12
 
Scrapping the ESR had a positive and significant effect on the share of exporting firms operating 
in SEZs. More precisely, the share of firms operating in SEZs in priority sectors, relative to non-
priority sectors, increased by 7 percentage points on average following Law 56-07 over the 
period 2006-2011. Law 139-11, in turn, led to an increase of 5.4 percentage points in the share of 
SEZ exporters on average in non-priority sectors vis-à-vis the situation with ESR (Figure 12). 
  
                                                          
12
 It is important to note that this effect is not statistically significant because the larger exporters — both in priority 
and non-priority sectors — have historically operated in SEZs. 
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Figure 12: How did the Removal of ESR in 2007 and 2011 affected the Share of SEZ in 
terms of Export Value and Number of Firms at the HS-6 Product-level? 
 
Note: The bars are the estimated coefficients of a regression in which the dependent variable is the share of SEZ 
exports (in terms of value in blue and in terms of number of firms in yellow) on interaction terms for priority and 
non-priority sectors after 2008 and 2012 respectively. All specifications include HS-6 product and year fixed 
effects and HS-2 product-specific linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the HS-6 product level. 
Vertical lines denote confidence intervals. 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
 
Although the reforms allow firms operating in SEZs to sell products to the domestic 
market, very few of them actually do this. The majority of firms are still primarily engaged in 
exporting, and only sell domestically on very rare occasions, either to fulfill small orders, to sell 
surpluses of export orders or units that do not comply with international standards. Only firms in 
the pharmaceutical sector sell most of their production domestically. Many textiles, apparel and 
footwear firms interviewed for this report, which belonged to the so called national priority 
sectors established under Law 56-07, were not even aware that this law had eliminated the 80 
percent ESR. Moreover, the firms also feel that the customs procedures involved in selling 
domestically are unduly confusing, and therefore do not justify the hassle of selling domestically 
given the small market size. Furthermore, new firms wishing to operate within SEZs need to be 
approved by the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas and this public-private body seems keen to 
only authorize firms that are focused on exporting activities rather than those focused on serving 
the domestic market. In summary, although the de jure ESR has been removed, the interviews 
with firms and regulatory bodies suggest that there is currently a de facto ESR in place. 
Law 139-11 induced firms located in SEZs and those producing non-priority products to 
export new ‘varieties’ (combinations of new products and/or new destinations). More 
specifically, there is a 9 percentage point increase in exports of new varieties originating from 
non-priority SEZ firms relative to the pre-reform situation. Law 56-07, on the other hand, 
seemed to have triggered the exit of export varieties for non-SEZ firms in priority sectors, 
despite the fact that this law was more generous towards non-SEZ firms than Law 139-11. These 
results are illustrated in Figure 5. Neither the 2007 nor the 2011 reform appeared to have 
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produced a significant effect on the value of exports or the number of destinations served by 
established exporters – i.e. those firms that export in every year of the period of analysis. 
The results overall show that removing the ESR for firms operating in SEZs without 
altering the fiscal incentives available to them has made SEZs in the Dominican Republic a 
more attractive location for firms to operate in. In terms of export performance, this means 
that in a given HS-6 industry, firms in SEZs account for a larger share of exporters following the 
scrapping of the ESR. This was the case both after the sector-specific policy change in 2007 and 
after the broad-based reform of 2011. Neither reform significantly affected the share of exports 
(in terms of value) accounted for by SEZ firms. There are two reasons which explain this 
finding: the fiscal incentives extended to non-SEZ firms in priority sectors were not sufficiently 
large to produce a substantial change in the composition of exports at the product level; 
particularly given that non-SEZ firms accounted for less than 2 percent of textiles and apparel, 
leather and footwear before the reform. In non-priority sectors, which were less dominated by 
SEZ firms prior to the policy change, firms operating outside the zones had to compete with SEZ 
firms domestically and do so without receiving the same fiscal incentives as SEZ firms following 
the elimination of ESR, which places them at a disadvantageous position.  
Figure 13: Did the 2007 and 2011 Reforms Induce Entry or Exit of Exported Varieties? 
 
Note: The bars are the estimated coefficients of a regression in which the dependent variable is 
a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 when a firm starts to export a new HS-6 product in a 
given year and 0 otherwise on interaction terms between a firm’s SEZ and priority-sector status 
after 2008 and 2012 respectively. All specifications include HS-6 product x SEZ and year x 
SEZ fixed effects and HS-2 product-specific linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the HS-6 product level. Vertical lines denote confidence intervals. 
Source: authors’ calculations 
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6. Conclusions and Policy Directions 
Over the past decade, the elimination of trade preferences in the garment industry has hit 
the SEZs in the Dominican Republic, but some revival in SEZs’ activity has been observed 
since 2009. The sharp decline in export-oriented textile manufacturing in the aftermath of the 
MFA in 2005 is also reflected in a subsequent falling in export shares, prior to a modest recovery 
in 2010. The decline in garment manufacturing was accompanied by a decrease in garment 
imports, closure of companies in this sector and declining real wages. At the same time, a shift 
towards more capital-intensive manufacturing, accompanied by increasing wages in these 
sectors, is observed. Following the global slowdown in 2009, SEZs in the Dominican Republic 
started to accelerate their diversification into footwear, surgical equipment, electrical products, 
and pharmaceuticals. As of 2015, SEZs remain a main driver of export performance, 
concentrating around half of total exports, although their share has declined notably vis-à-vis 
increasingly dynamic local exports (mostly resource-based production).  
An increasing reliance on imported inputs has been observed over the past decade in SEZs 
at the same time that the Dominican Republic joined more sophisticated global value 
chains and reduced its reliance on garment production. The emergence of more sophisticated 
sectors led to more production stages being carried out in the country, increasing the domestic 
value added embedded in exports. Even the clothing sector experienced more domestic value 
addition in exports. However, the degree of domestic linkages, proxied by the share of inputs 
acquired domestically, remain low. There is a widespread agreement that the current regulatory 
framework is compliant with WTO commitments, which the country was bound to meet in 
December 2015.  
In order to leverage SEZs as a vehicle of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, this 
report suggests interventions focused around three priority policy areas: 
1. Policies aimed at encouraging domestic linkages: A comprehensive strategy to support 
and develop linkages includes actions around three areas. Firstly, it prescribes a regulatory 
review to remove ineffective policies such as harmful local content requirements and 
protectionist non-tariff measures that restrict the ability of domestic firms to import key 
inputs that can be transformed and sold to SEZ firms. Other de jure or de facto regulatory 
barriers for supplying SEZ firm from national territory should also be removed.
13
 Secondly, 
it involves connecting domestic suppliers by designing targeted programs for local 
suppliers, developing a supplier database, creating matchmaking services, and introducing 
incentives to encourage local sourcing from SEZ firms. Thirdly, it requires attracting 
competitive international suppliers and support the upgrading of domestic suppliers. A 
sector-specific analysis to assess the competitiveness and binding constraints of domestic 
                                                          
13
A series of interviews conducted with local entrepreneurs point to connectivity problems and the administrative 
barriers of considering sales from the national territory to the SEZ as “exports” that need to go through customs, as 
factors that are potentially discouraging the emergence of local suppliers. 
29 
 
suppliers in a value chain with potential to develop domestic linkages is warranted. 
Footwear and electrical products can be good candidates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the low scale as well as the inability to meet string technical standards greatly limit the 
ability of domestic suppliers to connect with SEZs enterprises. Annex 1 provides example of 
successful suppliers’ development programs in Chile, Costa Rica, and Hungary. 
 
2. Support policies that ameliorate labor adjustment costs accrued by the structural 
change in sectoral specialization in SEZs: The Government should consider social 
assistance programs designed to accelerate worker employment transitions to lower labor-
intensity industries. These programs include vocational training in new skills demanded by 
SEZ firms, job search assistance, and transitional income support. Because open-ended 
financing for skills upgrading that is not targeted may have little if any financial returns, 
training programs need to be carefully designed, targeted, and incentivized, for example, 
through cost sharing by the worker (see Hollweg et al. 2014).  
 
3. Improve the institutional coordination across multiple actors working on the overall 
support framework for trade and FDI competitiveness: The lack of institutional 
coordination is pervasive in the Dominican Republic. In the case of trade and 
competitiveness, there are multiple actors involved in trade and investment promotion. On 
the one hand, public entities, such as the export and investment promotion agency (CEI-
RD), have the mandate to delineate the policy and strategy but in reality their work is 
limited due to thin budgets. On the other hand, private or mixed entities, such as the national 
commission of SEZ (CNZFE), work with more resources to attract FDI into the multiple 
parks. Additionally, the fact that many parks are privately-owned generates incentives for 
private actors to attract international investors. A national export and investment strategy 
coordinated and vetted by the different actors in conjunction with an empowered CEI-RD 
could improve the overall support framework for trade and competitiveness. This strategy 
should include a robust cost-benefit analysis of the SEZ framework. 
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Annex 1: Supplier Development Programs 
 
Costa Rica 
 
The Supplier Development Project for High-Tech Multinational Companies of Costa Rica was 
established in 1999 as a pilot project, aimed at (i) helping to increase domestic added value in the 
output of high-tech transnational corporations; (ii) improving the competitiveness of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and (iii) enhancing the technological capacities of SMEs. The 
overall aim of the project was to enable SMEs to attain the technology levels necessary for their 
vertical integration into high-tech transnational corporations’ production chains. The pilot project 
was funded by the Foreign Trade Promotion Agency of Costa Rica, the Costa Rican Coalition of 
Development Initiatives, the Chamber of Industry, transnational corporations and SMEs. 
 
Following successful completion of the pilot project in 2003, a domestic-supplier development 
office (Costa Rica Provee) was created, which has been integrated into the Foreign Trade 
Corporation of Costa Rica (PROCOMER). The project supports the manufacture of products by 
SMEs for high-tech transnational corporations’ production chains. It selects, according to 
motivation and quality criteria, SMEs to be admitted to the program. A methodology is then 
drawn up by an international expert, on the basis of analysis of product demand from the high-
tech multinational companies and on the technical and entrepreneurial status of the SMEs. 
According to Intel-Costa Rica’s business development manager, within its first three years, this 
program helped to increase the number of suppliers Intel used by a factor of ten (Villalta 2005). 
Costa Rica Provee increased the number of linkages it facilitated with all companies, overall, 
from 18 in 2003 to 150 in 2006 (Cordero and Paus 2008).  
 
The project fosters the development of the selected SMEs through technical assistance and 
training activities. There is also an information-gathering system in operation to provide the 
enterprises involved in the project with access to sources of supply of and demand for products 
and services, to establish links with SME support institutions and to guide the SMEs in their 
search for funding and venture capital. 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2009) 
 
Chile 
 
The Suppliers Development Program (SDP) was launched by CORFO (Corporación de Fomento 
a la Produccción) in 1998. The program was motivated by the trade agreements signed by Chile 
that created the need for compliance with international production standards by Chilean 
exporters and potential exporters. The SDP aimed at improving and stabilizing the commercial 
linkages between small and medium-sized suppliers and their large firm customers –potential 
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exporters– as to achieve higher levels of flexibility and adaptability and guarantee the quality of 
products and services at different stages of production. 
 
The government program subsidizes projects aimed at strengthening the management of SME 
that are suppliers of large firms; which in turn are the ones that sponsor the projects. The 
program also subsidizes additional activities complementary to the activities these large firms –
the sponsor firms– normally run: specialized services, professional advice, training, technical 
assistance, and technology transfer. SME appropriate the benefits of the development projects 
achieving a stable market for their products and services, while the sponsor firm ensures a 
continuous supply of quality products and services. 
 
For a large firm to be eligible to participate in the program and sponsor the SME that make up its 
supply chain, its net annual sales must be greater than or equal to 100,000 Unidades de Fomento 
–equivalent to US$42.6 million in August 2010. Each project must include at least 20 SME in 
the agriculture and forestry sector or a minimum of 10 SME in other economic activity sectors 
such as manufacturing, industrial services and others; these SME must have net annual sales up 
to 100,000 UF. Once the sponsor firm approaches an intermediary agent, who helps the sponsor 
firm prepare the project, the firm can present its project to a CORFO regional bureau that decides 
to reject, approve, or request the reformulation of the project submitted according to the 
eligibility requirements and the technical quality of the application. 
 
After the project is approved the program is implemented in two stages: a diagnostic stage and a 
development stage. The diagnostic stage lasts up to six months after the signing of the contract 
and aims at identifying areas of intervention that the sponsor wishes to develop with its suppliers. 
The result is a development plan designed by a consultant or consulting firm. CORFO pays for 
up to 50% of its cost with a ceiling of US$16,000 (August 2010). The development stage is the 
implementation of the development plan designed in the diagnostic stage and can last up to three 
years. CORFO pays for up to 50% of the cost of this stage with annual ceilings of US$110,000, 
US$5,000 per supplier firm (August 2010). CORFO assesses annually the renewal of project 
financing depending on the implementation progress. The implementation of the development 
plan is responsibility of the sponsor firm and can be carried out by a consultant or consulting 
firm or by the sponsor's in-house staff. 
 
A project subsidized by the program, then, must be sponsored by a large firm and include a 
minimum number of SME that comprise this firm's supply chain. The project co-finances a 
diagnostic stage and then the actions designed to implement a development plan, which depends 
on the needs assessed in the diagnostic, aim to strengthen the suppliers and consequently benefit 
the suppliers and the buyer. 
 
Source: Arráiz et al (2011) 
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Hungary 
 
To increase the FDI benefits, the Hungarian government launched the Supplier Target Program 
(STP) in 1998. The first phase was marked by implementation difficulties. After two years, some 
principles were reconsidered and the program was re-launched in 2000 as a cluster scheme. The 
basic idea of the new Program is that existing supplier networks can be further developed as a 
nucleus of a bigger and more colorful cooperation network, a local cluster. The ISP gives priority 
to relatively advanced supplier firms.  
 
The ISP focuses on some existing supplier networks. In the center of these, there is a core 
company, the Integrator. The Integrator firm is the primary partner of the state agent. The already 
chosen Integrators are Suzuki, General Electric, Audi, Opel and Raba. The promotion activity 
starts with identifying the needs and requirements of MNCs and other integrator firms. The 
Integrators actively contribute to the planning and creation of a cooperation network, a business 
cluster.  
 
The state partner of the Integrators is the local office of the Regional Development Corporation 
(RDC), a venture capital firm. However, new Supplier Agencies are to be established. A new 
institution, the Supplier Employment Company, was also established to do the trainings. The 
program originally focused on the automobile industry, electronics and rubber, but it 
subsequently added textiles, furniture, building materials, services and retail trade. Matchmaking 
events are also continuously organized, and there are plans to update the established database of 
1500 potential qualified suppliers to some 4-5 thousands. The Program also plans long-term 
finance for necessary investment in supplier firms. This would include both loans and equity 
participation (venture capital function).  
 
According to the UNCTAD interviews with Hungarian representatives, the ISP reached an 
extensive network of firms. In mid-1999, the program covered 1438 supplier firms. The value of 
deals contracted and signed through the then National Subcontracting Information Network 
reached US$ 6 million in 1999. Between 1998 and 2000, the key foreign affiliates (as mentioned 
above) signed 76 supplier contracts under the program. The value of 21 contracts publicly 
announced was US$ 24.5 million per annum. 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2001) and Szanyi (2002) 
